



REPORT

THE POLISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL STUDIES OF THE POLISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
NORWEGIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE SECURITY POLICY OF POLAND AND NORWAY IN THE NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND EUROPEAN DIMENSIONS

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Introduction

Notwithstanding considerable differences in geography and in economic and demographic potential, Poland and Norway are close security policy partners, with their cooperation in the field resting on a solid foundation of similar threat perceptions and well-defined strategic interests, shared by both countries. The most important of those interests is to keep the North Atlantic Alliance strong and able to effectively provide security to member states, primarily through the credible capability of direct defence of their territories, and then later through crisis-management operations and cooperative security. It is precisely within the NATO framework and at the political level that the Polish-Norwegian cooperation has grown most dynamically, especially with increasing instability in the European security environment following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. And yet, the potential for closer collaboration between Poland and Norway and for sharing one another's experiences is much larger than current practice would indicate.

The present report analyses key aspects of Polish and Norwegian security policy, where both countries could benefit from the other party's good practices and experience, and where they could establish closer cooperation. The research covers areas representing three broad dimensions of security policy: national, regional and European. These are also the three levels of governance, as they are proposed in the methodological framework of the GoodGov project.

The first chapter discusses the framework for the country's long-term approach to Russia, on the assumption of continued tensions in relations between Russia and the West. A similar analysis for Poland is provided in the second chapter. The goal for this part of the report is to highlight the fundamental role of the Russian factor as an element bringing Poland and Norway closer together and at the same time to present differences in how the two countries respond to this factor. While both Poland and Norway place the Russian threat atop their security concerns lists, the Norwegian approach, for example, includes as a fixed element self-restraint in military activity (nationally and at the Allied level), with a view to de-escalating possible tensions with Russia. Poland, meanwhile, has for years sought increased Allied military presence on its territory, in step with dynamic technical modernisation and transformation of its own armed forces.

Chapter III focuses on the rank and role of regional defence cooperation in the security policy of Poland and Norway. It analyses the determinants, sources and achievements to date of two regional defence cooperation groupings in which Poland and Norway are often seen as leaders: the Visegrad Group (V4) and NORDEFECO (Nordic Defence Cooperation). Even though growing from different roots, functioning according to different mechanisms, and comprising very different memberships, both the V4 and NORDEFECO are facing similar challenges, such as problems with launching oft-announced joint armament procurement projects. This chapter seeks to identify factors increasing the chances of success for regional defence cooperation initiatives and to define their optimal level of ambition, which is of particular importance for Poland as it aims to build a strong regional bloc of security and defence collaboration.

The fourth chapter discusses the experiences gained by Norway and Poland with NATO's ISAF operation in Afghanistan (the most important foreign military mission so far for either country), and in particular Afghan security sector reform. The "whole of government approach", followed by Norway in Afghanistan is juxtaposed with the Polish engagement there, which was not founded on any detailed strategy. The chapter seeks to identify the best practices for participation in such missions (particularly within the security sector reform domain)—a subject of particular significance for Poland, which, with a wealth of mixed experience from Iraq, Africa and Afghanistan, now seems to be looking for an optimal pattern for contributing to such international operations.

In the closing portion, the report offers recommendations on how to tighten up Polish-Norwegian cooperation in the analysed security policy dimensions and an attempt is made to identify areas where both countries can learn from one another's best experiences. While most of the conclusions call for room for greater effectiveness of Polish security policy based on the Norwegian example, this part of the report also includes concrete proposals for potentially promising bilateral initiatives and suggestions on improvements in Norway's security policy. As matters stand, Poland and Norway can become even closer partners in the security policy field and become pillars of NATO's eastern flank.

1. Russia: A Strategic Challenge in the North

Jakub M. Godzimirski, Ulf Sverdrup

An April 2010 agreement with Russia to delineate the Barents Sea border was widely heralded in Norway as its biggest post-Cold War diplomatic success and a vindication of the policy of close regional cooperation between the two countries. Five years on, though, Norwegian policy towards Russia is undergoing thorough re-examination. Russia, and previously the Soviet Union, as a neighbour has always been a major factor defining Norway's security policy.¹ Consequently, any changes in bilateral relations with the powerful neighbour to the east have direct impact on Norwegian thinking about national security and relations with the other elements—the United States and NATO/European Union—of the “strategic triangle” that has informed the Norwegian security strategy and foreign policy.²

There are many serious reasons behind this reassessment of Norway's policy towards Russia, the most important one being obviously the latter's role in the Ukraine crisis and breach of legal and political rules on post-Cold War cooperation in Europe. The illegal annexation of Crimea and Russia's direct and indirect support for the Donbas separatists, coupled with aggressive rhetoric and huge investments in armaments, have triggered changes in the Norwegian perception of Russia, which also translates into a string of political decisions on security and bilateral relations. A neighbour of Russia with incomparably lower military, demographic and economic potential, Norway—unlike many other European countries—is particularly sensitive to any changes in the strategic surroundings that could adversely affect its national security. The Russian behaviour, which includes the direct use of its armed forces, is seen in Norway as destabilising the overall international environment.

And yet, the country declares the will to continue peaceful cooperation with Russia in areas where it is important and possible without compromising the country's national interests. One example is the formalised collaboration, in place since 1977, on joint management of marine resources in the Barents Sea region, which Norway sees as a case of protecting its economic interests via positive engagement. The formal institutional frameworks for such cooperation—for example, the OSCE—remain unchanged, even though its background and conditions are diametrically different. The question, then, is how can this influence the future of Norway-Russia relations?

To find an answer, one will have to take a look at Norway's past approaches towards cooperation with Russia and consider how Russia's actions over the past two years have compelled Norway to reconsider the main parameters of Norwegian security policy.

Norway's policy towards the USSR during the Cold War was founded on two dominant concepts: **deterrence** (*avskrekking*) and **reassurance** (*beroligelse*).³ The former has been and is

¹ An informative introduction to the Norwegian debate on foreign and security policy can be found in: L. Lunde et al. (eds), *National Interest. Foreign Policy for a Globalised World: The Case of Norway*, MFA, Oslo, 2009. Also, see: O. Riste, *Norway's Foreign Relations—A History*, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 2005, and N. Græger, H. Leira, “Norwegian Strategic Culture after World War II: From a Local to a Global Perspective,” *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 45–67, 2005, which discuss an array of specific determinants influencing the Norwegian approach to the country's security and foreign policy.

² The strategic triangle concept was proposed in I.B. Neumann, S. Ulriksen, “Norsk Forsvars- og Sikkerhetspolitikk,” in: T.L. Knutsen, G. Sørbo, S. Gjerdåker (eds), *Norges Utenrikspolitikk*, Cappelen Akademisk Forlag, Oslo, 1995, pp. 94–123.

³ One of the best analyses of the Norwegian security policy during the Cold War is provided in J.J. Holst, “Norwegian Security Policy: The Strategic Dimension,” in: J.J. Holst, K. Hunt, A.C. Sjaastad (eds), *Deterrence and Defence in the North*, Norwegian University Press, Oslo, 1985, pp. 93–132.

based on the country's membership in NATO, where the main objective for Norway has always been to make up for a structural imbalance in relations with the eastern neighbour whose economic, demographic and military potential—even at its crisis-affected lowest—has exceeded Norway's many times over. Just as in most other countries, the Norwegian perception of security threats is influenced by the perception of other actors' military capabilities and their intention to use armed forces and other instruments to achieve a strategic advantage. The way these two elements are understood in the Russian context is among the most important factors shaping Norwegian policymakers' approach to security policy.⁴ In view of the existing difference in potential in relations with the USSR/Russia, membership in NATO has been and is seen in Norway as the most effective way of protecting national strategic interests—on the assumption, of course, that the Alliance will come to the country's succour in a crisis.⁵ This is one of the reasons why NATO membership is so popular among the Norwegian public, even though decision-makers and experts do not shy away from a discussion of the credibility of Allied guarantees. But even without one-hundred percent certainty of the Alliance's effective help in a crisis, the membership itself raises the threshold of potential aggression because a potential aggressor, too, is not sure how Norway's allies, led by the U.S., would react.

Until recently, another traditional element of Norway's approach to, first, the USSR and then Russia was a policy of reassurance, linked to the factor described above and also to the previously mentioned uncertainties about the eastern neighbour's intentions and the quality of Allied guarantees. The goal of this policy was to signal to Moscow policymakers that the NATO membership is of a defensive nature and must not be seen as a threat to the USSR/Russia. An additional factor underlying this Cold War-era approach was Norway's realisation that in order to avoid the prospect of a conflict being sparked by some misunderstanding, it should make only limited use of the border area for actions that the other side could interpret as preparations for attack—remembering that the Norwegian-Russian border runs just 50 km away from Soviet/Russian strategic naval bases of the Northern Fleet, known to military strategists as the “Northern Bastion.”

In accordance with the reassurance idea, Norway has embraced an array of self-imposed restrictions (*selvpålagte restriksjoner*), which it kept not only during the Cold War but also many years after its end. The restrictions, which mostly had to do with the country's NATO membership, included these three most important ones: a ban on permanent deployment on Norwegian territory of armed forces of other states, including NATO members; refusal to have nuclear weapons stationed in the country; and, the decision on not allowing manoeuvres and war games to be conducted in areas bordering the USSR/Russia. These self-imposed restrictions sometimes caused strains in relations with the Allies, who tended to accuse Norway of a selective approach to the principles of Allied collaboration, but Oslo saw the restrictions as justified as they seemingly contributed to a lessening of tensions.⁶

After the Cold War, Norway added a third element to its Russia policy—**engagement (engasjement)**—which can be viewed as a local variant of the German policy towards Russia, known as “change through rapprochement” (*Annäherung durch Verflechtung*). Its goal has been to bring Russia into a nexus of international cooperation at the global, continental and regional levels, and to back Russia's democratic and market-oriented transformations in the hope that after the deep crisis Russia would emerge as a new full-fledged member of the European and Western

⁴ See, for example, A. Kjølberg, *Livet i hegemonens skygge—en småstats sikkerhetslogikk*, FFI Rapport 2007/01626, Kjeller, 2007, <http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2007/01626.pdf>.

⁵ For more on the subject, see, N. Græger, “Norsk NATO-debatt etter den kalde krigen,” *Internasjonal Politikk*, vol. 63, no. 2/3, 2005, pp. 217–241, and S.V. Rottem, “The Ambivalent Ally: Norway in the New NATO,” *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 28, no. 3, 2007, pp. 619–637.

⁶ N. Ørvik, “Norway: Deterrence versus Nonprovocation,” in: N. Ørvik (ed.), *Semialignment and Western Security*, Croom Helm, Beckenham, 1986, pp. 186–247.

community of democracies. The best known and visible manifestations of this policy included the establishment, on Norway's initiative, of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, and also the direct and indirect support for Russian transformations in the early 1990s.

Norway re-examined its policy towards Russia in response to the latter's actions in Ukraine, representing aggression—both open and concealed—against a neighbour that chose pro-European orientation over closer ties with Russia. First of all, Norway issued its unambiguous condemnation as early as March and April 2014, and joined the restrictive measures imposed by the EU, United States and other Western countries. Furthermore, right in late 2014, as part of 2015 budgeting preparations, many Norwegian institutions—including the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence—presented their highly critical, detailed assessments of the Russian actions towards Ukraine. And third, towards the end of 2014, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence commissioned a study by a group of experts to assess the impact of Russian activities on the security situation, and propose measures Norway should take under the new circumstances. The findings of this research were published in May 2015 in the report "Shared Effort" (Et felles løft),⁷ which included a host of conclusions about the impact of Russian actions on the situation in Europe and West-East relations.

The key takeaway from the report is that Russia is in the course of rebuilding its military capabilities, thus greatly deepening the disproportion to Norway, which is at a disadvantage even despite major Norwegian investments in the security sector, such as the purchase of new multitask aircraft for the country's armed forces. As Norway sees it, the present Russian government not only intends to use its armed forces, it has in fact already used them to reach its political and geopolitical objectives in relations with its neighbour Ukraine. As such, these actions have created a qualitatively new security situation in Europe. With Norway unable to meet the new challenges on its own, the report recommends that the country tighten strategic cooperation with the Allies as the only path to a credible deterrence policy towards Russia. Also, to make Norway better prepared for the new challenges, it is recommended to: improve intelligence-gathering and monitor strategic developments in key areas; increase the credibility of Norway's deterrence capability by raising defence spending and using existing resources more effectively; prepare the Norwegian and Allied armed forces for a swift response and arrange for a permanent presence of Norwegian forces in areas most exposed to hostile activity, including near the border with Russia; and, provide more effective support for the armed forces in their effort to improve the country's security.

Thus, the reaction from Oslo to Russia's actions in Ukraine has been multidimensional. Not only did Norway frequently criticise Russia and join the Western sanctions, it also took practical steps such as freezing its military cooperation with Russia; raising the 2015 defence budget by Nkr1.46 billion (\$185 million), or by 3.4% (even if not intending to reach the NATO-recommended goal of 2% military spending as a proportion of GDP)⁸; providing financial and political support for Ukraine; taking part in the biggest military exercises on the territory of new NATO member states, including in the Baltic states; running large-scale manoeuvres near the Russian border for the first time in recent history; taking an active part in NATO's preparations for new challenges and making its security guarantees more credible; and, tightening up security

⁷ The document is available from the Norwegian government website at <https://blogg.regjeringen.no/annedivi/files/2015/03/2015-04-27-Et-Felles-L%C3%B8ft-webversjon.pdf>.

⁸ According to a recently published FFI report, Norway's defence spending in 2015 represents 1.43% of GDP, which is much below the level recommended by NATO. For more on the subject, see, I.H. Berg, S. Nyhus Kvalvik, "Makroøkonomiske trender 2015—utvikling i norsk og internasjonal forsvarsøkonomi," FFI Rapport 2015/00032, Kjeller, www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/15-00322.pdf.

cooperation among the Nordic states, as reflected in the joint declaration of five defence ministers published in May 2015.⁹

All these measures testify to Norway's changing perception of the direction taken by Russia and the evolution of that country's political system. Until recently, Russia was seen as a country with a slow pace of often unsuccessful attempts at modernisation and democratisation. Today, it is viewed as having undergone a transformation towards greater centralisation and a strengthening of nationalistic elements, with a strong element of authoritarianism. Russia's chances of becoming part of the West in the near future are believed to be nil, the country being perceived as too much different from, and even hostile towards, the West.¹⁰

Second, the perception of the Ukraine conflict has changed diametrically. In its early stages, it was believed to have only limited consequences for Norway and little impact on bilateral relations (even despite Russia's violation of international law and norms of coexistence). But the present assessment is that a return to the *status quo ante* will be extremely difficult to achieve. The Ukraine conflict is no longer viewed as local and peripheral, but as part of a deep crisis in West-Russia relations. Ukraine is no longer seen as a cause but as a symptom. Uncertainty as to Russia's policy and interests is on the rise and there is the concern that the crisis may escalate and draw in the Baltic states, northern areas and even Svalbard. This makes the situation more dangerous and less predictable.

And third, a warranted question arises about the effectiveness of Norway's policy towards Russia in the past 10 years. This policy, especially in the High North, was based on the hopes of raising the level of mutual trust by means of increased cooperation. That approach, though, failed the test of time—even if one should remember that Norway is not the only country faced with this new challenge (similar doubts are entertained also in Berlin and other Western capitals).

While it is true that most Norwegians would admit that engagement policy has lessened tensions and produced many welcome outcomes, this approach has been increasingly criticised and opinions have emerged that such a perception of Russia was naive. In other words, more and more cracks can be seen in the consensus on the policy to be pursued towards the eastern neighbour. It can thus be assumed that along with voices urging continuity of mutual-trust policy, there will be a growing swell of opinion in favour of a policy founded on lack of trust in the eastern partner.

Norway's policy towards Russia can also be expected to be increasingly coordinated with the European and transatlantic policymaking community. Norway will still be able to pursue its Russia policy with a local twist, but this local dimension will be perceptibly narrower than in the past.

What is changing is not just the policy design but also those doing the designing. In the past, the policy on the High North was largely inspired by the vision of a foreign policy based on cooperation in sectors such as energy, transport, fishing, local development and the environment. At present, the policy towards Russia is designed by the military and the security experts. And interest in contacts with Russia on the part of the Norwegian business community has been diminishing, too, in response to lower oil prices and poor prospects for the Russia economy.

Norway is now facing a slew of challenges. On the one hand, it has to pursue a policy of deterrence and containment, but on the other it must take care to ensure that the achievements to date are not wasted. It must take certain military activities to prepare for possible Russian

⁹ "Fem nordiske ministre i felles kronikk: Russisk propaganda bidrar til å så splid," *Aftenposten*, 10 April 2015, www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikker/Fem-nordiske-ministre-i-felles-kronikk-Russisk-propaganda-bidrar-til-a-sa-splid-7967230.html.

¹⁰ An interesting discussion on the subject is found in the recently published book, T. Heier, A. Kjølberg, *Norge og Russland. Sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer i nordområdene*, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 2015.

provocations and for a situation in which automatic support from the Alliance cannot be taken for granted, but at the same time the country has to avoid an unnecessary escalation of tensions in bilateral relations. Norway has to resist Russian policy but it also has to reflect on how other actors will react to its choice of Russia policy. Another goal should be to limit the risk of a conflict breaking out by accident, which necessitates keeping open channels of communication with Russia. Pursuing such a balanced and multi-target policy is a tall order indeed, but it is imperative if unnecessary, dangerous escalations are to be avoided. This policy must also be innovative and open to new approaches, if only to make use of new openings if and as these emerge.

Poland, just as Norway, has vital interests in finding a right response to the Russian challenge. The Polish attempt at a reset in relations with Russia, taken in 2009, had much in common with the Norwegian policy of engagement—but with both policies staying largely within the liberal paradigm, their continuation has been rendered impossible by the Russian actions in Ukraine. Given the destabilisation of the international system in the wake of these actions, countries such as Norway and Poland, which cannot respond to the Russian challenge on their own, should seek an increase in the effectiveness of Allied arrangements meant to ensure their security in a time of crisis. There can be no doubt that Norway's and Poland's memberships in NATO offer the best protection of both countries' vital interests in the present geopolitical situation. It is thus in their shared interest that the effectiveness of Alliance activities be increased, its internal cohesion strengthened and its credibility as an effective instrument of international security improved.

However, the Alliance itself has to cope with a number of strategic and economic issues. Its strategic challenge is to ensure the security of member states in Central and Eastern Europe—which these states are loudly demanding—but without contravening the spirit and the letter of the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act, something that Western European members would not allow to happen, at least in the short term. The Norwegian model of NATO membership, which proved effective during the Cold War and helped to lower tensions afterwards, could provide a response to this challenge, even if resistance should be expected from many countries in the region with entirely different experiences than those of Norway. And the Polish approach to NATO's economic questions, including defence spending at 2% of GDP, could provide an example to follow by those member states that, like Norway, remain below that level, thus provoking internal tensions within the Alliance and seriously undermining its cohesion.

2. Poland and the Russian Threat to the East

Krzysztof Kasianiuk, Tomasz Paszewski

In the public discourse in Poland, the Ukraine crisis is usually portrayed as the major challenge to the country's security. In the hot phase of the conflict, Polish tabloids were full of dire predictions, almost as if the hostilities could have spilt over the border. The conflict in Ukraine, however, is a manifestation of an incomparably broader problem, namely Russia's neo-imperial policy in Europe. One of its sources—no doubt about it—is the nature of the present Russian regime, which, after failed attempts to modernise the country's political, economic and social systems, is seeking at any price an external source of legitimacy in the eyes of Russian society. But it also must be acknowledged that Russia's great power strivings are "in the DNA" of Russian policy in Europe and some other regions, reflecting its centuries' long self-identification as an empire that extends its borders and builds its sphere of influence abroad. Russia did not abandon these great power aspirations even during its time of weakness and relatively liberal course in its foreign and internal policies in the 1990s. They will continue to pose a durable geopolitical threat to most of Russia's neighbours to the West, Poland included, which has experienced Russian imperialism first-hand over the past two hundred years.

The Ukraine crisis has also vindicated Polish assessments of trends in Russia's foreign and security policies, assessments which remained virtually unchanged since the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union. Back in 1993, in a report published by PISM, Antoni Z. Kamiński not only predicted a possible Russia-Ukraine war and wrote about its consequences for Poland (a wave of refugees) but also presented an accurate diagnosis: "In assessing changes in the Russian consciousness, the diminution of its imperial component and Russian's evolution into a modern nation, the most important factor to be taken into account is Russians' attitude towards Ukraine—their readiness to accept the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state. On the formal level, this already took place. But much seems to indicate that Russia is pursuing an attrition strategy against Ukraine and at the same time seeks that country's isolation in European politics." Kamiński also argued that the restoration of authoritarianism in Russia would hark back to "the imperial component of the Russian national identity, and to the idea of gathering all Russians in a single state, which translates into territorial claims, especially against Ukraine."¹¹

Over the past quarter-century, the Russian threat has been a key factor in organising Poland's security policy. In this context, the primal and fundamental interest of Poland is to ensure the survival and continued sovereignty of the Polish state in the event of either open military conflict with Russia or political conflict coupled with a below-war-threshold use of force (hybrid or conventional) or threat of such use. Arising from this fundamental interest are functional interests: keeping NATO strong and capable of reacting to the Russian threat while speaking with a single voice, notwithstanding the evident deep differences among European member states in their perception of Russia's behaviour and its role in Europe and the world; keeping a U.S. strategic presence in Europe, including military assets (troops, equipment, bases); strengthening the EU's competences in security in such a manner that they complement the Alliance's capabilities; promoting in Central and Eastern Europe a shared perception of the Russian threat and shared concepts of how to respond to it.

These interests have been in fact and to a large extent reflected in the pursuit of Poland's foreign and security policy. Since 1991, the main perceived threats to national security have

¹¹ A.Z. Kamiński, "Bezpieczeństwo Polski na tle rozwoju sytuacji politycznej w Europie. Uwagi metodologiczne," in: *Raport o stanie bezpieczeństwa państwa – aspekty zewnętrzne*, PISM, Warszawa, 1993, pp. 17–18.

been from beyond Poland's eastern border, and, to simplify somewhat, security was seen as a function of Russian actions on the one hand and the West's political and military coherence on the other. This coherence has been a key factor determining, for example, the credibility of NATO's security guarantees, which Poland received in 1999, although not without difficulties raised by the resistance of many Western European states to NATO's expansion with "the end of history," as Francis Fukuyama puts it, with which the end of the Cold War was equated. The Polish political elites saw closer integration with the West as the principal remedy for threats arising from the re-emergence of Russia's imperial policy. Poland was ready to invest a lot in cohesion and the politico-military vitality of NATO—and, to a lesser degree, in the European Union, whose security and defence competences were only at a nascent state (and which for several years now have been in a state of deep crisis, as reflected in the EU's perceptibly lower level of activity under the Common Security and Defence Policy, or CSDP). In parallel, Poland sought to strengthen relations with key allies, particularly the United States, and projected an image of a tested and reliable partner, motivated by the desire to accumulate political capital that could be used if the country found itself in danger.¹² These functional goals underpinned the Polish presence in stability and peace operations and also the country's readiness to take part in the first U.S. missile defence project in Central and Eastern Europe.

The Russian factor has indisputably played a very important role in shaping the rationale of these policies, but its role, however, has been very rarely publically acknowledged. This points to an important feature of Polish security policy, namely a certain divergence between, on the one hand, the officially declared goals and identified threats and, on the other, the actual motives by political decision-makers. As Prof. Mieczysław Stolarczyk put it: "Even though Russian threats were not explicitly referred to in successive Polish security strategies adopted after 1989, they were usually regarded as the biggest threats to Poland in the practice of Polish foreign and security policy."¹³ Moreover, Polish strategy documents, as well as politicians' speeches, academic publications and media comments, have for years been clearly influenced by the Western perception of the security environment, including an excessive focus on the currently "fashionable" asymmetric and non-military threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, migration, cross-border organised crime, climate change, etc., which, especially from the current perspective, does not seem to be warranted by the evolution of Poland's immediate security environment.¹⁴

Today, having left Afghanistan and with greatly reduced contributions to other stability and peace missions—and, most importantly, with the ongoing crisis in Ukraine behind the border—Poland does not conceal its scepticism towards asymmetric and non-military threats, which Western European countries regard as priority. Or, to put it more precisely, in its declarations Poland fully recognises these security challenges, but at the same time it emphasises that, unlike the political and military threats, they are not threatening the state's existence, independence or territorial integrity. And this approach finds reflection in the country's involvement in efforts to combat such threats. On the domestic level, in 2012 Poland launched an ambitious rearmament programme—Plan for Technical Modernisation of the Armed Forces in 2013–2022—seeking to replace many obsolete post-Soviet systems with state-of-the-art American and Western European products. Importantly, the emphasis was largely placed on systems that are useful in territorial defence, such as anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems, Spike anti-tank guided missiles, transport and combat helicopters, artillery systems, submarines, and modernisation of Leopard-2 tanks. At

¹² See, e.g., M. Zaborowski, *From America's Protégé to Constructive European: Polish Security Policy in the Twenty-first Century*, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2004, p. 12.

¹³ M. Stolarczyk, "Rola Rosji w polityce bezpieczeństwa Polski pod koniec pierwszej dekady XXI wieku," in: K. Budzowski (ed.), *Polska wobec wyzwań bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, Krakowskie Towarzystwo Edukacyjne, Kraków, 2010, p. 132.

¹⁴ R. Jakubczak et al. (ed.), *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe Polski w XXI wieku: wyzwania i strategie*, Bellona, Warszawa, 2006, p. 51.

the end of the previous decade, a decision was taken to switch to a professional army, seeking to improve personnel quality by replacing poorly trained draftees with professional servicemen better skilled and capable of operating sophisticated weapons. On the international level, starting as early as 2008, Poland solicited updates of NATO contingency plans of response to the threat of a classical military crisis on the eastern flank; in 2010, the country strongly lobbied for Article 5 and collective defence to be described as the fundamental task of the Alliance; and this was followed in 2014 by numerous calls for the Alliance's increased military presence in countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, various Polish politicians are now increasingly demanding NATO permanent bases in Poland and countries of the region. In fact, starting well before the Ukraine crisis, Poland pursued a relatively coherent policy focused on the principal task of defending the country against traditional hard security threats. This contrasts with the previous period in which some "spectacular events" (such as NATO's air campaign against the former Yugoslavia, 9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, etc.) had had an excessive impact on Polish security policy, absorbing considerable resources and influencing plans for the armed forces' transformation.¹⁵

But even despite certain flaws, inconsistencies and, at times, a reactive nature, the Polish post-1991 security policy served the protection of national security interest in a pragmatic way, and to a degree, which until recently, looked sufficient. After all, at the global and regional levels, that policy was shaped in an international context that has been changing at a rapid pace for several years now. While the military threat in the east of Europe is at its highest since the end of the Cold War, the West's capacity to react to various kinds of crises is greatly constrained by the consequences of the recent recession and other internal problems, and simultaneously it is weakened by a proliferation of threats and instability in recent years. Responding to the new circumstances, the U.S. and the leading Western European powers are in the midst of major reassessments of their security strategies, which will not be without influence on the functioning of NATO and the EU. This will also impact Poland, whether directly or indirectly.

At the same time, another potential Russia-related threat has been emerging in the east, arising this time not from that country's military might or great power ambitions, but rather from its economic weakness, which may bring about—suddenly and unpredictably—a major crisis of the Russian economy and of the Russian state, or at least serious internal destabilisation. Such a scenario, which last time was seriously considered in the early 1990s—when the peaceful disintegration of the USSR and its transformation into the CIS was hardly a foregone conclusion—is now increasingly viewed as realistic and equally dangerous as it was then. Unfortunately, the deepening recession in Russia does not diminish the former threat that Moscow might again resort to using its military power. Not inconceivably, the country's accumulating problems may prod the Russian regime to make further aggressive moves abroad. History knows well many such examples.

¹⁵ B. Balcerowicz, "Aktywność Polski w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa euro-atlantycznego," in: S. Bieleń (ed.), *Polityka zagraniczna Polski po wstąpieniu do NATO i Unii Europejskiej. Problemy tożsamości i adaptacji*, Difin, Warszawa, 2010, p. 131.

3. Regional Cooperation with Hurdles: NORDEFECO and V4

Pernille Rieker, Marcin Terlikowski

NORDEFECO, launched in 2009, primarily at Norway's initiative, is often portrayed in the European security debate as the paragon of a regional cluster of countries, pragmatically collaborating in the development of military capabilities, operational deployment and also military education, training and exercises. Other similar European clusters such as the Visegrad Group—which has sought this status, at least at the declaratory level¹⁶—are often compared with NORDEFECO and are in search of best practices and secrets to success. But contrary to conventional wisdom, NORDEFECO grapples with a host of limitations that effectively call into question its original optimistic assumptions. To fairly assess the potential for regional security and defence cooperation as such—and, consequently, to establish a feasible level of ambition—one has to be aware of the existing barriers and also analyse the factors behind the success of particular projects. This is all the more pertinent for Norway and Poland because NORDEFECO and the Visegrad Group, respectively, provide important channels—even if for different reasons—for them to pursue their security policy goals.

The main areas where NORDEFECO projects are successfully carried out include: military education, training and exercises; logistics and support; expeditionary operational engagement; and, joint military capabilities.¹⁷ Cooperation in armaments ended in failure when the flagship project—the joint acquisition by Sweden and Norway of the Archer artillery system—collapsed in December 2013. However, there is some progress when it comes to less-sensitive equipment, as reflected in the joint framework agreement on the delivery of military trucks signed by Norway and Sweden with German company Rheinmetall. Work is also underway on the shared acquisition of munitions and spares for various weapons. In 2014, with the Russia-West crisis growing worse, the relatively new function of NORDEFECO gained importance: it became a forum for political and defence consultations, especially in assessing the evolution of the Russian threat.

NORDEFECO's success is unquestionable as far as pragmatic areas go, but it is less obvious in more complex fields of cooperation. Projects with large value-added for the armed forces and savings-generating projects have already borne fruit, but none is of any major importance in the overall dimension of the Nordic countries' security policy. It is sufficient to look at NORDEFECO's most spectacular achievements: cross-border air force training (engaging aircraft crews from various countries who meet in military airspace with no need to rebase); coordination of military air transport under the NORTAT project (making aircraft and crews available to partners without forming new joint units); cooperation in the completed logistic operation to pull out national contingents from the ISAF mission; and the ongoing cooperation (especially on the logistic level) in supporting initiatives to build local military capacity in Africa under the lead of the African Union (East Africa Standby Forces) and the UN mission in Mali, *MINUSMA*. Other projects underway provide for the exchange of information from national air and maritime surveillance systems; and there are also plenty joint courses and training programmes for officers and NCOs, including shared use of simulators.¹⁸

At the same time, NORDEFECO member states do not hide that they regard this cooperation mechanism as an auxiliary tool in their security policy. Its importance is technical rather than

¹⁶ See, e.g., "Joint Communiqué of Visegrad Group Defence Ministers," Litoměřice, 4 May 2012.

¹⁷ For more on NORDEFECO achievements, see, P. Rieker, M. Terlikowski, "The Limits and Achievements of Regional Governance in Security: NORDEFECO and the V4," *PISM Policy Paper*, no. 25 (127), August 2015.

¹⁸ See: NORDEFECO, *Annual Report 2014*, www.nordefco.org, pp. 10–12.

political.¹⁹ Politically, no additional value was provided even by the April 2015 announcement by five Nordic defence ministers of tighter cooperation in response to Russia's actions in Ukraine and towards NATO member states. Under the declaration, NORDEFECO will broaden the extent and scale of existing projects and seek new areas in which to collaborate rather than encompass new, more ambitious goals.²⁰ A number of indications confirm such an assessment: the Nordic countries have not embraced a regional solidarity clause (despite numerous proposals by experts); they do not seek defence plan integration or harmonisation, have no plans for joint military units, and do not really want to specialise in niche military capabilities.

The pragmatic (or perhaps technical) nature of NORDEFECO cooperation should be considered a major source of its success. The focus of NORDEFECO is on added value in military—not political—terms. Cooperation has been advancing in all areas of military activity where it can produce tangible financial savings, enhance soldiers' experience and knowledge, or—as far as the operations are concerned—where it can help implement a given mission's mandate. Projects are carried out only when they do not put at risk key national security interests, strategies, preferences, etc. Of particular importance here is respect for the diversity of the Nordic states' relationships with NATO. A good illustration of this issue is that Sweden and Finland, which are not NATO members, have strived and ultimately found a special formula allowing their *de facto* participation in the NATO mission to control the airspace over Iceland in 2014, while it was still referred to as a NORDEFECO exercise.

But there are also additional factors that have helped NORDEFECO to develop swiftly. To begin with, the Nordic states have a tradition of security policy cooperation dating back to at least the 1990s.²¹ There is also linguistic and cultural affinity, and finally the specific administrative culture permitting much greater freedom—compared to many other European states—in horizontal contacts between institutions (and, to some extent, between states) at the expert and technical levels, with only a generally formulated political mandate for such activity. The latter feature—as suggested by the Nordics themselves, especially Norwegians—comes as a result of small populations being clustered in several urban centres, which influences the forms of people-to-people relations, both in their private and professional contacts.

It also needs to be noted that NORDEFECO is handled in a structured and orderly manner. Within five cooperation areas—capabilities; armaments; human resources and education; training and exercises; and operations—conceptual work is initially conducted to identify niches offering the best outcomes and biggest chances of success, and this is followed, first, by an evaluation of the conditions that have to be met for projects to start and, then, their implementation. As many as several dozen projects are taken into consideration and potentially planned for launch, including highly ambitious ones, such as specifying—or at least outlining—the joint tactical and technical requirements for anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence systems. Thus, many NORDEFECO projects are confined at their initial stage to something like a feasibility study, which is subsequently presented at the political level—and only there is the decision made for a project to be either implemented or shelved.

Still, NORDEFECO's progress is and will continue to be restricted by considerable differences among the Nordic countries. It is obvious that Sweden and Finland—despite their

¹⁹ See: Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg's address to the Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Leangkollen Conference, 2 February 2015, www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/opening-speech-at-theleangkollen-conference/id2365340.

²⁰ The announcement was made in a joint article by defence ministers from NORDEFECO states for the Norwegian daily *Aftenposten*, 9 April 2015. See: The Norwegian Ministry of Defence, "Taking steps towards enhancing the cooperation on defence," a joint opinion written by the ministers of Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Iceland, originally published in Norwegian in *Aftenposten*, 9 April 2015, www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/viutdyperdetnordiskeforsvarssamarbeidet/id2404378.

²¹ See: P. Rieker, M. Terlikowski, *op. cit.*

very close integration with NATO, further strengthened by additional military agreements with the Alliance (2014)²²—cannot be fully incorporated into NATO military planning²³ as long as they remain outside the bloc. This has the direct effect of constraining the exchange of strategic planning information. Besides this, the Nordic states are in no hurry to give up—even partly—their sovereignty over military matters, and they have yet to show any interest in abandoning control of their military capabilities, something which would come as a result of genuine military integration. Cooperation within NORDEFECO has so far stopped a step away from creating interdependencies between partners, especially such that would deprive them of decision-making and operational freedom in crisis situations. In this context, it should be noted that the EU's Nordic Battlegroup—which was on standby in 2008, 2011 and 2015—is the Nordic countries' only joint military capability and remains outside NORDEFECO (whereas within NORDEFECO, work is underway on the concept of a smaller, modular battalion task force to be readied by 2020). Moreover, given the paralysis of the EU's CSDP in respect to battlegroups' operational use, the chances that the Nordic Battlegroup could be used in an EU military mission are close to nil, which means that it is more a training and interoperability vehicle rather than an operational asset. Tellingly, when proposals were made in 2011 on the EU political level to use the Nordic Battlegroup (then on standby) in the military operation in Libya, these proposals were rejected by both Sweden and Finland, citing what they considered an ill-aligned structure of the battlegroup to the potential mandate of the proposed EU military mission.²⁴

NORDEFECO also cannot be seen as a bloc of states linked by a common assessment of the Russian threat and how to counter it. Finland, with several decades of experience with Soviet domination, has a different take on the balance between deterring Russia and engaging it in pragmatic (including economic) cooperation than does Denmark (which traditionally sees no direct threat in Russia), Norway (which shares maritime borders with Russia in a large swath of sea, rich in natural resources and minerals), neutral Sweden or unarmed Iceland. These are fundamental differences that often escape attention—when NORDEFECO is viewed superficially—but which dim the prospect of the Nordic states developing a unified policy towards Russia.

The experience of NORDEFECO permits drawing conclusions for other mechanisms of regional security and defence cooperation in Europe. They have particular value for Poland, which, at least since 2011, has sought to activate this kind of cooperation within the Visegrad Group, previously perceived almost exclusively as a forum for political consultations. It is to be regretted that work on particular joint projects has so far brought only limited results in the V4. Progress in some cases is accompanied by numerous delays, failures of more ambitious project proposals and, most troubling, the growing distrust among partners on the political level, stemming from different assessments—by Poland and the other V4 members—of the roots of the Ukraine crisis and its consequences for European security.²⁵ Still, Poland invariably declares its readiness to build a regional bloc in Central and Eastern Europe that would not only promote a shared perception of the Russian threat but that also would engage in particular military projects that tangibly contribute to strengthening European defence capabilities. What, then, is needed for such cooperation to advance and be at least as effective and as commended as NORDEFECO?

To begin with, the ultimate success of V4 cooperation would require that the emphasis be shifted away from political motivation, which predominates in the current discourse on the V4's role as a security policy vehicle, towards technical aspects. Given the differences in perception of the Russian threat held by Poland on the one hand and the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary

²² See, e.g., W. Lorenz, "Finland Gets a Foot in NATO's Door," *PISM Bulletin*, no. 93 (688), 30 June 2014.

²³ On the other hand, though, the Swedish armed forces were regarded in NATO plans as allied forces that would pursue scenarios developed by the Alliance.

²⁴ T. Behr, "The Nordic Countries and the Arab Spring," in: L. Sadiki (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization*, Routledge, London, 2014, p. 581.

²⁵ See: P. Rieker, M. Terlikowski, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

on the other—which, though they existed in the past, were sharpened by the Ukraine crisis—the strong politicisation of collaboration within the group may prove a recipe for paralysis. In these circumstances, even though successive declarations by V4 prime ministers and defence ministers may contain plenty of highly ambitious provisions, it should be those value-added elements that drive assessments of projects under consideration, their implementation, and proposals for new cooperative activity. Such an approach is warranted in light of the following two considerations.

First, a permanent structure of military cooperation within the Visegrad Group was finally established in 2014. Under the *Framework for an Enhanced Visegrad Defence Planning Cooperation*, a document adopted by defence ministers at their Visegrad meeting on 14 March 2014, ongoing cooperation on the technical level is to be run by the V4 Defence Planning Group, comprising national directors in charge of either defence planning or armaments policy, and supported by *ad hoc* teams of experts. Politically, the group will be subordinated to the Senior Policy Body—composed of secretaries of state, political directors, or armaments policy directors at the V4 ministries of defences—which will coordinate cooperation at the political level. This procedural arrangement draws technical and expert personnel into a process whereby potential cooperation areas, barriers and the feasibility of particular projects are identified and their launches negotiated. In this kind of collaboration, differences in threat perception at the top political level cease to be of paramount importance. Obviously, there must be the political will to go on with the cooperation, thus producing a mandate for expert-level efforts. But such a mandate will be easier to obtain if at the political dimension cooperation goals have already been formulated with an emphasis on pragmatic fruits of cooperation.

Second, all of Poland's partners are interested in this kind of cooperation as not only because it provides a chance for them to develop their own military capabilities but also as a way to contribute to Allied initiatives within the Readiness Action Plan. Informal suggestions have emerged to the effect that the Allied framework will provide the main format for a host of V4 military cooperation projects (especially exercises). This was reflected in the joint *Action Plan and Strategy for Training and Exercises*, adopted on 23 April 2015 at the V4 defence ministers meeting in Tomášov to crown the Slovakian presidency of V4. The concept of pragmatic cooperation proved attractive to the partners, notwithstanding their pronounced differences in policy towards Russia and the Ukraine crisis.

The Visegrad Group should also learn from other NORDEFECO qualities that have underpinned the successes of many Nordic projects, especially the importance of laying down the foundation for cooperation in the form of organisational structures, human resources, tested procedures, etc. NORDEFECO was born from the merger of earlier mechanisms of military cooperation in particular fields, which in turn were preceded by an array of other initiatives, e.g., joint exercises. Thus, the success of numerous NORDEFECO projects is rooted in the legacy of many years of technical cooperation, less visible on the political level and much narrower than NORDEFECO, but sufficient to produce good practices and build trust among partners. A particular lesson for the V4 is, thus, that time is needed before the fruits of cooperation can be tasted and that less ambitious projects should be conducted for the time being while simultaneously working to build structural foundations for more complex initiatives in the future. Translating this general precept into details, it can be said that the V4 Defence Planning Group requires at least 2–3 years to develop formal and informal mechanisms for its effective operation. Only then can more ambitious projects be seriously addressed and taken up by the V4.

Furthermore, the V4 must not cease looking for new areas of cooperation. Conducting feasibility studies for proposed projects the way NORDEFECO does—even if the projects are later rejected—provides valuable experience and help in understanding the dynamics of national preferences for armed forces' transformation, functioning of military administration, in the attitude towards Allied initiatives, and in specific relations between the defence industry, government, the

military, etc. Experts from outside the armed forces and foreign services should also participate in these efforts, just as with NORDEFECO.

Regional security and defence cooperation is a mighty challenge for the participating states. There is a consistent message coming from NORDEFECO, the Visegrad Group and several other formats of this kind of cooperation in Europe: the most ambitious projects, dealing with joint procurement or armaments or formation of military units, cannot be implemented quickly or at the beginning of the cooperation process. Success comes easier in military-to-military cooperation through education, training, exercises, exchange of information, logistics and support, etc. A stable administrative structure is also needed to manage cooperation and oversee an orderly process of best-project identification, implementation and ongoing evaluation. The Nordic countries and the Visegrad Group seem to be aware of these conclusions. If they are translated into concrete actions, both clusters will face an intriguing future.

4. Shared Experiences from Afghanistan

Wojciech Lorenz, Marcin A. Piotrowski

Alongside the growing threat posed by Russia's confrontational policy towards the West, an equally important challenge for European security comes from conflicts and instability in the immediate neighbourhood of the transatlantic area, namely Eastern Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel. The capability to build and reform the security sector in partner states so they can more rapidly increase their own contribution to solving crises may become an important direction in NATO's and the EU's efforts to overcome adverse tendencies in Europe's vicinity. It is therefore important to analyse the experiences of countries such as Norway (a member state of NATO) and Poland (a member state of both NATO and the EU), which have contributed considerable military and civilian resources to the longest and most complex peace and stability operation so far, the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in 2001–2014. The valuable experiences gained by Norway and Poland may also serve to tighten up cooperation between both countries and increase the effectiveness of future missions.

The main motive behind Norway's participation in the Afghanistan mission was to demonstrate NATO solidarity post 9/11 and to effectively combat the sources of international terrorism.²⁶ Initially, in 2002–2005, the country's contribution to the anti-terrorist coalition and the NATO ISAF mission was limited to several dozen troops (special forces, air force, logistics). In 2009–2011, the Norwegian rotation in Afghanistan numbered 400–500 personnel, putting the country at the 11–12th position among the 49 nations in the ISAF operation. Most of the Norwegian forces were concentrated in Faryab province in northern Afghanistan, where a Norwegian-led international team, Provincial Reconstruction Team-Faryab, operated from 2009 to 2012. Following the closure of the ISAF mission in 2014, Norway has remained a part of NATO's new advisory mission, *Resolute Support*, with 56 service personnel.

Even though support for the security sector reform was just one of many areas of Norwegian activities in Afghanistan, the acquired experience may greatly increase the effectiveness of crisis-response operations in the future. This gives Norway a wide spectrum of national instruments and flexibility of international-action options, while confirming the image of a country that has competent experts and capacity to perceptibly contribute to the building of international security (as reflected in the foreign ministry's slogan, "Norway as a Peaceful Nation").

Norway demonstrated in Afghanistan its ability to make effective use of human and material resources in pursuing the developmental, political and military goals arising from participation in an international operation. It had at its disposal a relatively wide range of resources and action options, making it possible to flexibly reconcile the requirements of Allied strategy and its own capabilities and ambitions. A five million-strong nation with an army of 25,000, Norway deployed in Afghanistan—for national and allied goals—the Telemark battalion (250–550 troops), special forces (up to 150), a considerable contingent of civil and military experts (up to 70–80) and humanitarian- and development-aid resources (its Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, or NORAD, affiliated with the foreign ministry).

From 2005 on, after joining the U.S.-led combat operation Enduring Freedom, Norway saw its priority as participation in the NATO-ISAF counter-insurgency mission, accompanied by the building of Afghanistan's security structures: the army (Afghan National Army, ANA) and

²⁶ Based on published sources and interviews with Norwegian civilian and military experts. For more on methodology and references, see, W. Lorenz, M.A. Piotrowski, "Norwegian and Polish Security Sector Reform Experiences from Afghanistan," *PISM Strategic File*, no. 1 (64), January 2015.

the police (Afghan National Police, ANP). Norway began to back the military operations with a proportionately growing commitment to civilian affairs. A key objective, in compliance with ISAF strategy, was to create smoothly operating security structures and forces (ANA, API), a matter of crucial importance to the long-term stability of the state. Importantly, most of the Norwegian projects aiming to build Afghan security structures in Faryab province and help central institutions in Kabul look solid and durable, which—in the opinion of the Defence Research Establishment (*Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt*, FFI) and NORAD—distinguishes them from the backdrop of worsening security conditions in many other provinces.

Norway was capable of raising the effectiveness of its actions to reform the security sector's civil segment (police and justice) because its foreign ministry had access to civil experts adequately trained in peace and crisis response missions. These were mostly police (CIVPOL) and justice (*Styrkebrønnen*) specialists, including judges, prosecutors and prison wardens. The scale of their deployment was contingent on a given group's regulations and the mission's requirements—in 2012, for example, 32 police officers from CIVPOL and 40 experts from *Styrkebrønnen* were posted in Afghanistan. Norway also made use of experts from the FFI research institute and from the Norwegian Defence International Centre (NODEFIC), affiliated with the NDC military academy. The first pool of civilian experts was established in Norway in the 1990s (it currently comprises 80 police officers from CIVPOL, 90 lawyers from *Styrkebrønnen*, and 32 experts in transition and democratisation from NORDEM). These arrangements facilitated civilian engagement planning and guaranteed the continuity of measures conducted at various stages of the mission by adequately prepared staff.

Norway's participation in peace and crisis response missions traditionally followed the so-called Norwegian Model in which civilian and military structures are separate and independent of one another, but in Afghanistan, with the Norway-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), this arrangement failed and had to be replaced with a pragmatic approach. The low level of security, requiring permanent protection and logistical support from the Norwegian forces for civilian activities, necessitated a switch to the Anglo-American "Whole of Government Approach" model,²⁷ which provides for integrated civilian-military activity. Such close coordination of activities proved imperative in order to ensure the effectiveness of the measures taken—especially in security sector reform, which involved the army, gendarmerie, policy and civilian experts from different government departments and NGOs.

In its development projects and efforts to build the Afghan security sector, Norway deemed it important to regularly evaluate the attainment of goals—at each level and in each institution—also with the help of external experts. This constant emphasis on efficiency improvement increased the chances of creating well-functioning, durable arrangements within the strategy framework of NATO and partnering international organisations. Under the Norwegian culture of teamwork and permanent learning, the acquired experience can be drawn upon on a regular basis. The Norwegian arrangements and procedures thus make it possible to raise the effectiveness of future missions.

The Norwegian experience can be tapped to directly serve Poland's security requirements and policy. This is because, in step with the worsening security environment in Europe and its environs, growing demand should be expected for capabilities to run complex missions within the EU, NATO, UN and OSCE frameworks, and as part of *ad hoc* coalitions of the willing.

In this context, the Norwegian and Polish experience from the Afghanistan mission may help to more effectively protect both countries' political and military interests and give maximum

²⁷ In addition to the "Whole of Government Approach," other terms used in the evolving Anglo-American thinking about civilian-military cooperation models (to reflect the complexity of such missions and tasks) include "Comprehensive Approach" and the increasingly popular acronym "JIIM" (Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational).

influence on the shaping of the security environment through adequately profiled participation in future peace and stability operations in which security sector reform will be an important condition of crisis settlement. This is particularly important at a time of new threats arising in the post-Soviet area and the south of Europe in the wake of, respectively, Russia's aggressive policies and actions by the so-called Islamic State. It may soon turn out that NATO's and the EU's crisis response requires building effective security structures in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Libya, Tunisia, Iraq and, perhaps, also in other countries neighbouring the transatlantic area with steadily growing instability potential due to economic, political or ethnic reasons (the Caucasus, Central Asia, Sahel).

The Norwegian experience in Afghanistan highlights the need for an integrated approach involving government, the military and NGOs right at the stage of formulating an initial concept of engagement. Consequently, if Poland chooses to commit itself to a particular mission, it would be desirable to set up an interministerial task force to provide coordination. A culture of civil-military teamwork and coordination should also take root at the lowest, tactical levels of each mission and to which Poland should opt to contribute.

Poland should take its cue from Norway and form a permanent pool of government and NGO experts able to support the building of security structures at strategic and operational levels, and to provide adequate, profiled training for selected police officers and justice officials. This requires conceptual collaboration and improved legal regulations within the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Affairs and Justice. With such a pool of experts, Poland could react more flexibly to the requirements—often fast-changing—of a given mission, thus not only raising the effectiveness of its mission personnel but also enhancing the political benefits when promoting the country's image and interests within a given organisation or coalition.

As Norway's Afghanistan experience demonstrates, doctrinal attachment to the separation of civilian- and military-security spheres may perceptibly constrain Poland's room for manoeuvre. Such an approach is impractical, especially when an operation is run mostly through the military channel. Consequently, to ensure effective support from the security sector's civilian portion, Poland should make wider use of crisis-management opportunities offered by the military gendarmerie, e.g., in training the local police force in a destabilised country. Alternatively, or as a complementary move, a special forces detachment/advisory team could be formed especially to take care of countries and missions of major importance for Poland.

Another important conclusion from Norway's presence in the Afghanistan mission is the importance of permanent learning and need for procedures that put the acquired experience into practice on a regular basis. A promising move was made with the establishment of the Doctrine and Training Centre of the Polish Armed Forces which largely focuses on traditionally understood military tasks. What is lacking, though, is its civilian counterpart, or counterparts (outside of the Ministry of Defence), which actually could be much smaller in size than the centre. There can be no doubt that diagnosing foreign-mission problems and experience and reviewing practical conclusions for the future is something in which the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs should take interest, too.

The Norwegian and Polish engagement contributed perceptibly and importantly to security building and stability in Afghanistan. The experience gained in the process transcends Afghanistan and may serve to further improve both countries' civilian and military structures. Many of Norway's systemic arrangements can be introduced in Poland with relative ease. They can also help tighten up cooperation between the two countries and increase their effectiveness in future missions.

5. Recommendations for Poland and Norway

Closer cooperation between Poland and Norway became possible after Poland's NATO accession in 1999, and it is precisely the Allied dimension where both countries' security interests are closest. The major unifying theme is the emphasis on raising the credibility of Article V of the Washington Treaty, and thus of collective defence, as the very foundation of NATO. Prior to 2010, when the Alliance was focused on the exhausting ISAF mission in Afghanistan, the two partners backed each other in attempts to broaden in-house discussions at NATO to include the question of boosting Article V credibility with concrete measures in the fields of military planning, exercises and command structure reform. Poland and Norway were close partners during the debate on the Alliance's *New Strategic Concept*, adopted at the Lisbon Summit on 19 November 2010. Both countries also joined forces in seeking to have Allied reflection focused on the future of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, to rule out any kind of unilateral withdrawal by NATO and, at the same time, draw the Alliance's attention to the problem of Russian non-strategic missiles with nuclear warheads. At the bilateral level, a major event was the 2008 purchase from Norwegian defence firm Kongsberg of Naval Strike Missiles (NSM) for the Polish Navy's Coastal Missile Unit. It provides the most effective means of defence of the Polish coast at present, and by 2018 it will be reinforced with another division. Importantly, the NSM acquisition project was carried out in close partnership with Polish defence companies and is largely seen as a success story. Norway was also the "special guest" at the International Defence Industry Exhibition (MSPO Expo) at Kielce in 2015, providing a practical confirmation of the growing intensity of Polish-Norwegian security policy cooperation. And still, the potential for bilateral collaboration and learning from one another has yet to be tapped in full. At all three levels of security policy—European, regional and national—Poland and Norway still have room for cooperating more intensely and sharing their best experience.

Polish-Norwegian Strategic Dialogue

Poland and Norway should consider turning their bilateral security policy consultations into a structured strategic dialogue, while simultaneously broadening it to incorporate military and expert levels. Such a dialogue would permit an in-depth discussion about the dimensions and segments of security policy that are prioritised by Poland and Norway. It should naturally deal with assessments of the Russian threat, including Russia's military activities in the Baltic Sea, its State Armaments Programme, command system reform, manoeuvres in the Western Military District and areas subordinated to Joint Strategic Command North, and others. Norway and Poland have considerable analytical expertise in this field, and both could benefit if it is juxtaposed and brought together. The dialogue could also deal with the question of the hybrid character of today's battlefield, which is a still vague concept and yet one that needs to be coherently formulated and translated into practical conclusions for the Alliance. The state's overall resilience to hybrid threats is a problem for both Poland and for Norway, remembering that the nature of future crises and treats—if they indeed assume a hybrid form—will be simultaneously politico-military, politico-criminal (terrorism, cyberwar, cybercrime), economic, social, environmental, etc. Other subjects that could be taken up in the dialogue include changes in the Polish and Norwegian doctrine and armed forces transformations in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, with emphasis on the expansion of popular territorial defence capabilities. Obviously, this list could be extended further.

Joint Agenda for the NATO Summit in Warsaw

Poland and Norway should closely collaborate in preparations for the Warsaw NATO summit, to be held in July 2016. A shared goal for both countries should be to curb tendencies to undermine the compromise on Allied policy towards Russia, as developed in the wake of early developments in Ukraine and confirmed by decisions taken at the September 2014 summit in Newport, Wales. Poland and Norway should also join forces to seek that—in line with Poland's proposals put forward at the June 2015 session of the North Atlantic Council—the Warsaw summit should adopt a package of measures consolidating NATO's military presence on the territories of eastern flank countries, and increasing the degree to which the Allied command structure and exercise programmes are prepared to deter Russia from taking steps to destabilise the East European Allies (so-called Warsaw Strategic Adaptation Initiative)

Poland and Norway should also seek to add the question of EU-NATO cooperation to the summit agenda. Collaboration between the two blocs has for years been blocked by the Turkish-Cypriot "double veto." Meanwhile, at a time of growing instability in the security environment, it does not suffice to confine this cooperation to the technical level (e.g., in informal meetings of both parties' personnel, or consultations between the NATO Secretary General and the EU High Representative For Foreign Affairs and Security Policy). Although solving the veto problem will be no easy matter and will not come immediately, the Alliance should propose practical measures that would permit linking technical cooperation with the political and strategic level, so the former is reinforced.²⁸

Flexible and Effective Defence Cooperation in the Region

Poland and Norway, being strongly committed to NORDEFECO and the Visegrad Group, should not hesitate to tap each other's experience. Poland in particular could make use of the identified factors behind NORDEFECO's success as it seeks to improve V4 cooperation, which has for years been marred by a chasm between ambitious political declarations and a fiasco of successive attempts at joint projects. It may be that the Visegrad Group, by taking its cue from NORDEFECO, should scale down its ambitions for the time being and direct all of its efforts into technical, military-to-military projects, producing added value in the military dimension (better training, increased interoperability, etc.) and also at the financial level (savings). Furthermore, Poland and Norway could consider intensifying NORDEFECO-V4 collaboration, possibly with the participation of the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) and also Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. Even if the size and diversity of such a large bloc were initially to confine cooperation strictly to the political level—the creation of a regular platform for political consultations could bring longer-term military and political benefits, especially if coupled with administrative mechanisms serving to share good practices on operational engagement, participation in Allied initiatives to implement the Readiness Action Plan, or joint projects to develop military capabilities.

Polish Model of Expeditionary Engagement

Poland should take a close look at Norway's involvement in Afghanistan, especially when seeking to develop its own concept of contributing to crisis-management operations. Norway has been pursuing a coherent concept of its presence in this mission in which an armed forces deployment went hand in hand with strong support for development and furthering human rights.

²⁸ N. Græger, J. Todd, *Still a "Strategic" EU-NATO Partnership? Bridging Governance Challenges through Practical Cooperation*, PISM Policy Paper, no. 21 (123), June 2015.

To this end, considerable civilian assets were put to use, both public and private (in a so-called whole of government approach). Norway has thus been building its international image as a promoter of certain values and norms and, at the same time, a generous development aid donor. Such profiling brings Norway long-term political and economic benefits, arising, for example, from its continued presence in a country of operational engagement. Meanwhile, Poland, which has participated over the past 15 years in military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Congo, Chad, Mali and the Central African Republic, openly declared it was motivated primarily by Allied solidarity and only later by threats stemming from security crises in those countries. The functional goal of Polish engagement was to strengthen the country's political position within NATO and the EU, and also vis-à-vis strategic partners, such as the United States. Poland did not present an original vision or strategy for its engagement in crisis-management operations, profiling its presence in such a way as to minimise costs and achieve maximum visibility and operational autonomy for the Polish contingents. This is not to say that Poland should rigidly copy the Norwegian profile of engagement in peace and stabilisation missions and Norway's image as a human rights promoter and development aid donor. Yet, it is imperative that a Polish doctrine, concept or strategy for participation in expeditionary operations be developed so that the country could put its assets to more effective uses in pursuing its strategic interests while strengthening international stability. Proposals of this kind, and even ready-made concepts, were put forward in the past.²⁹ At present, the concept should ensure both the predictability of the Polish activities (which is important for the country's foreign partners) and also flexibility. This is all the more important in the context of Poland's present emphasis on territorial defence, at the expense of participation in the Alliance's crisis management operations, which may lead partners to perceive Poland as a single-issue country. If such a perception were to take root, the political advantages of contributing to the military operations of the past 15 years could be easily obliterated.

²⁹ See, e.g., F. Gągor, K. Paszkowski, *Międzynarodowe operacje pokojowe w doktrynie obronnej RP*, Wyd. Adam Marszałek, Warszawa, 1998.

The **Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)** is rated among the 20 most influential government-affiliated think tanks worldwide. It promotes the flow of ideas that inform and enhance the foreign policy of Poland. PISM provides independent analysis and advice to all branches of government, contributes to wider debates on international relations and houses one of the best specialist libraries in Central Europe.



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Project GoodGov—“National and European Governance: Polish and Norwegian Cooperation Towards More Efficient Security, Energy and Migration Policies”—is a Polish–Norwegian research project conducted by PISM in cooperation with NUPI and ISP PAN.

This report concludes the GoodGov project's second work package focused on security policy. Three papers were published within its framework, examining in turn: the conditions that must be met before the EU and NATO can establish a genuine strategic partnership; the potential for exchanging experiences between Poland and Norway with regard to regional defence cooperation vehicles (NORDEFECO and the Visegrad Group); Polish and Norwegian involvement in the security sector reform in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan and its impact on shaping both countries' future participation in foreign military operations.

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